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Does a wiser agent always produce a higher value?
Gershon Wolansky1
Abstract
We consider an optimal partition of resources (e.g. consumers) between several agents, given
utility functions (”wisdoms”) for the agents and their capacities. This problem is a variant of
optimal transport (Monge-Kantorovich) between two measure spaces where one of the measures
is discrete (capacities) and the costs of transport are the wisdoms of the agents. We concentrate
on the individual value for each agent under optimal partition and show that, counter-intuitively,
this value may decrease if the agent’s wisdom is increased. Sufficient and necessary conditions
for the monotonicity with respect to the wisdom functions of the individual values will be given,
independently of the other agents. The sharpness of these conditions is also discussed.
Motivated by the above we define a cooperative game based on optimal partition and inves-
tigate conditions for stability of the grand coalition.
1 Introduction
Let X be a set of ”consumers”. Let I := {1, . . . N} be a set of ”agents”. For each agent i ∈ I we
associate a real valued function ψi on X. This symbolizes the agent’s ”wisdom”: ψi(x) is the profit
that agent i can make for a consumer x, if the latter uses her service. We denote the ”wisdom
vector” ~ψ := (ψ1, . . . ψN ) : X → RN+ .
Let µ be the distribution of consumers in X. In particular µ(X) is the number of consumers.
Each agent i has a limited capacity Mi > 0. This symbolizes the total number of consumers
she can serve. In other words, an agent i can serve a measurable set Ai ⊂ X of consumers for
which µ(Ai) ≤Mi. Another assumption is that each consumer can hire at most one agent, meaning
µ(Ai ∩Aj) = 0 if i 6= j.
The profit made by an agent i for her consumers Ai is just
Pψi(Ai) :=
∫
Ai
ψidµ .
Let ~M := (M1, . . .MN ) ∈ RN+ , and P ~M the set of all essentially disjoint measurable partitions of
X, that is
P ~M := { ~A := (A1, . . . AN ); Ai ⊂ X, µ(Ai) ≤Mi and µ(Ai ∩Aj) = 0 if i 6= j ∈ I .}
We distinguish between three cases:
Over Saturation (OS):
∑
i∈IMi > µ(X).
Saturation (S):
∑
i∈IMi = µ(X).
Under-Saturation (US):
∑
i∈IMi < µ(X).
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First paradigm: The big brother (or ”invisible hand”, or macro ”Keynesian distributer”) splits
the consumers X between the agents in order to maximize their total profit, taking account the
capacity constraints. Let
Σ~ψ(
~M) := sup
~A∈P ~M
∑
i∈I
Pψi(Ai) (1)
be the maximal total profit of the consumers.
Suppose a maximizing partition ~¯A( ~M, ~ψ) :=
(
A¯1( ~M, ~ψ), . . . A¯N ( ~M, ~ψ)
)
exists. The profit made
by each agent i for herself and her consumers under this optimal partition is her Individual Value
(i.v):
P¯i( ~M, ~ψ) :=
∫
A¯i( ~M,~ψ)
ψidµ . (2)
Remark 1.1. A maximizing partition can be interpreted as a Pareto efficient plan.
Second paradigm: Assume there is no big brother. The market is free, and each consumer may
choose his favorite agent to maximize his own utility. Each agent determines the price she collects
for consulting a consumer. Let pi ∈ R the price requested by agent i, ~p := (p1, . . . pN ). The utility
of a consumer x choosing the agent i is, therefore, ψi(x) − pi, if it is positive. If ψi(x) − pi ≤ 0
then the consumer will avoid the agent i, so he pays nothing and gets nothing in return. The net
income of consumer x choosing agent i is, therefore, [ψi(x)− pi]+ := max(ψi(x)− pi, 0).
Note that we do not assume pi ≥ 0. In fact, we also takes into account ”negative prices” (bonus,
or bribe).
The set of consumers who give up counseling by any of the agents is
A+0 (~p) := {x ∈ X;ψi(x)− pi ≤ 0 for any i ∈ I} (3)
while the set of consumers who prefer agent i is, then
A+i (~p) := {x ∈ X;ψi(x)− pi ≥ ψj(x)− pj ∀j ∈ I} −A+0 (~p) . (4)
Assumption 2.1 formulated in Section 2 below guarantees that {A+i (~p)} are essentially mutually
disjoint for any ~p ∈ RN , i.e. µ(A+i (~p) ∩A+j (~p)) = 0 for any i 6= j ∈ I ∪ {0}.
Definition 1.1. The vector ~p0 := {p0,1, . . . p0,N} ∈ RN is an equilibrium price vector with respect
to ~M if the set of the consumers who choose agent i meets her capacity constraint, namely
µ(A+i (~p0)) ≤Mi ∀i ∈ I ∪ {0}
where M0 := [µ(X)−
∑
i∈IMi]+. In particular, ~A
+(~p0) := (A
+
1 (~p0), . . . A
+
N (~p0)) ∈ P ~M .
Remark 1.2. Note that M0 = 0 in the S, OS cases, so an equilibrium price vector must satisfy
µ(A0(~p0)) = 0, and
∑
i∈I µ(Ai(~p0)) = µ(X).
Remark 1.3. An equilibrium price ~p0 can be interpreted as a Walrasian equilibrium.
2
Big brother meets the Free market : Theorem 1 in Section 2 below claims that there
exists an equilibrium price vector ~p0 which realizes the optimal partition of the big brother. The
corresponding partition ~A+(~p0) ∈ P ~M is unique (even though the price vector ~p0 is not necessarily
so).
Theorem 1 is strongly related to the celebrated theory of optimal mass transport (Monge Kan-
torovich). It can also be considered as a special case of the second Welfare Theorem.
The modern theory of optimal transport (OT) is a source of many research papers in mathe-
matical analysis [1], [2], [3], probability [30], [29], [6], [10], geometry [31], [32], [20], [22], PDE [5],
[19],[21], [18] and many other fields in (and outside) pure Mathematics [23], [24], [25], [13], [9], [17].
It generalizes the discrete assignment problem [15] to general (infinite dimensional) measure spaces.
The object of OT is very intuitive [14]. We are given two measure spaces: An atomless prob-
ability measure µ on X, and (not necessarily atomless) probability measure ν on a measure space
Y . In addition there is a measurable value function c : X × Y → R. An optimal solution is an
admissible, measurable mapping T : X → Y which maximizes T 7→ ∫X c(x, T (x))dµ(x) subject to
the constraint T#µ = ν, namely µ(T
−1A) = ν(A) for any measurable set A ⊂ Y .
Optimal partition (OP) is a particular aspect of OT theory [28]. It deals with the case where
one of the probability spaces, say Y , is a finite discrete one Y ≡ I := {1, . . . N}. In that case
the value function c is reduced to N functions on X, named ψi(x) := c(x, {i}) (”wisdoms”) and
ν({i}) := Mi ≥ 0 (”capacities”) satisfy
∑
i∈IMi = µ(X). An admissible mapping T : X → I is
a partition Ai := T
−1({i}) ⊂ X into measurable subsets of X verifying µ(Ai ∩ Aj) = 0 for i 6= j
and µ (Ai) = Mi. The Monge problem is reduced, in that case, to finding such a partition which
optimizes
∑
i∈I
∫
Ai
ψidµ under these constraints.
The result indicated in Theorem 1, Section 2, if restricted to the saturated case
∑N
1 Mi = µ(X),
can be seen as a special case of the general Kantorovich duality Theorem [31]. The uniqueness result
of Theorem 1 follows from Assumption 2.1 which is a generalization of the twist condition (c.f [7]).
The under-saturated case can also be included under this umbrella (c.f. Remark 5.2). The only
new feature (perhaps) of this Theorem is in the over-saturated case.
The existence of a unique partition guaranteed in Theorem 1 enables us to define individual
values generated by an agent (2) (c.f. also Definition 3.1 in Section 3). We interpret this individual
value as the sum of the profit of the agent and her consumers. In Section 6 we will introduce
alternative definitions of individual values, which are outside the scope of this paper.
Next, we address the question of monotonicity of the individual values with respect to the
wisdom of the agents. Intuitively, it seems that an increase of the wisdom of an agent without
changing the wisdoms of the other agents, nor the capacity of any of the agents will improve the
competitiveness of this agent and contribute to her individual value. It turns out that this is not
always the case. We obtain sharp estimates on the individual value under such assumptions in
Theorems 2-4 in Section 3.
The discussion on individual values leads naturally to study of coalitions and cartels. Suppose,
under the big brother paradigm, that the agents in a subset J ⊂ I decide to join forces and make
a coalition. They offer any potential consumer the best agent (for him) in that coalition, and unite
their capacities. This leads to a new partition problem where the agents in {i ∈ J} are replaced
by a single ”super-agent” J whose wisdom is ψJ(x) := maxi∈J ψi(x), and whose capacity is MJ :=∑
i∈JMi. The big brother now chooses the optimal partition between this super agent J and the
other agents (or other super-agents due to other coalitions). In particular, if a grand coalition J = I
3
is formed, then the ”individual profit” of this coalition is just PI ≡
∫
ψIdµ :=
∫
maxi∈I ψi(x)dµ(x).
Under the free market paradigm, the agents in a coalition J decide to unify the price (i.e., create
a cartel) for their services, so pi ≡ pJ for any i ∈ J . The free market now selects the optimal price
vector, under that constraint. It turns out that the partition due to this optimal price is the same
as the partition due to the big brother paradigm (Proposition 4.1).
If such a coalition/cartel is declared, the natural question is how to distribute the individual
value of the coalition between its members? In particular, if a grand coalition is formed, an agent
i will be happy if her share in the profit is not smaller than her share without joining the coalition,
or her share in a different (smaller) coalition J ⊃ {i}.
A cooperative game is defined by a real valued function ν acting on the subsets of the set of
agents: ν : 2I → R. For any J ⊂ I, ν(J) is the reward for the coalition J . In section 4 we define
such a coalition game where ν(J) is the individual value of a coalition J in the optimal partition
between two super-agents: J and its complement J− := I − J . After reviewing some concepts
from cooperative game theory (section 4.2) we discuss the stability of the grand coalition in the
special cases where all wisdoms are multiples of a single one, i.e. ψj(x) ≡ λjψ(x) where λj > 0 are
constants.
In Section 5 we introduce the tools for the proofs of Theorems 1-4.
2 Existence and uniqueness of optimal partitions
Assumption 2.1.
• X is a compact Hausdorff space, µ a probability Borel measure on X and ψi, i ∈ I are
continuous, real valued on X which are positive µ a.e, that is,∑
i∈I
µ(x;ψi(x) ≤ 0) = 0 . (5)
• For any r ∈ R and any i 6= j ∈ I
µ(x;ψi(x)− ψj(x) = r) = 0 (6)
• In the US case we further assume
µ(x;ψi(x) = r) = 0 , ∀i ∈ I . (7)
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 2.1
US: In the under-saturation case (
∑
i∈IMi < µ(X)), let
Ξ0~ψ(~p) :=
∫
X
max
i∈I
[ψi(x)− pi]+dµ(x) . (8)
Then there exists a unique equilibrium price vector ~p0 which is a minimizer of Ξ
0
~ψ
(~p) + ~p · ~M
on RN . Moreover, the associated partition A+i (~p0) (4) is the unique optimal partition which
maximizes (1) and we get
Σ~ψ(
~M) = min
~p∈RN
Ξ0~ψ(~p) + ~p · ~M ≡ Ξ
0
~ψ
(~p0) + ~p0 · ~M . (9)
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S: In the saturation case (
∑
i∈IMi = µ(X)), there exists an equilibrium price vector ~p0 which
satisfies (9) as well. This vector is unique only up to an additive shift p0,i → p0,i + γ where
γ ≤ 0. The associated partition A+i (~p0) (4) is the unique optimal partition which maximizes
(1).
OS: In the over-saturation case (
∑
i∈IMi > µ(X)) the existence and uniqueness are as in the
saturated case, and the actual capacity Mˆi ≤Mi of each agent is uniquely determined by the
maximizer of
~m 7→ Σ~ψ(~m) := min
~p∈RN
Ξ0~ψ(~p) + ~p · ~m, ~m ≤ ~M . (10)
In all the above, the unique optimal partition is given by (3,4) where A+0 = ∅ in the S, OS cases.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section 2.1.
Remark 2.1. In the saturation (S) or under saturation (US) cases, the optimal partition A¯i must
meet the limit of the capacity constraint, µ(A¯i) = Mi. Indeed, if a strong inequality Mˆi := µ(A¯i) <
Mi holds for some i ∈ I, then the non-consumers set A¯0 := X − ∪i∈IA¯i satisfies µ(A¯0) > 0 and
the big brother could increase the total profit Σ~ψ(
~M) by assigning the consumers from A¯0 to agent
i, c.f. (5).
Remark 2.2. A+0 (~p) (3) is a closed set since ψi are continuous (Assumption 2.1). The sets A
+
i (~p)
are essentially disjoint by definition and assumption (6), i.e µ(A+i (~p)∩A+j (~p)) = 0 for i 6= j ∈ I∪0.
Moreover, X = ∪i∈I∪{0}A+i (~p).
Remark 2.3. We may determine a unique vector price in the saturation (as well as the over-
saturation case) by assigning the reasonable condition that the agents set their prices as high as
they can. This is the maximal possible price for which µ(A+0 ) = 0:
~pγ¯ := ~p0 + γ¯~1
where
~1 := (1, . . . 1) ∈ RN , γ¯ := inf{γ ∈ R ; A+0 (~p0 + γ~1) = ∅ } .
Example 2.1. Assume N := |I| = 2 and the saturated case M1 +M2 = µ(X). Let
Aλi := {x ∈ X; ψi(x) ≥ ψj(x) + λ} (11)
where i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}. Indeed, A+0 (~p0) = ∅ in the saturated case, so Aλi = A+i (~p0) where λ = pi − pj
in that case (|I| = 2). By Theorem 1, the optimal share of agent i is determined by the condition
µ(Aλi ) = Mi. Thus, A¯i = A
λ¯(Mi)
i is the optimal share of agent i, where
λ¯(M) := sup{λ;µ(Aλi ) > M} = inf{λ;µ(Aλi ) < M} . (12)
In particular, if {xi} the set of maximizers of ψi − ψj in X then (recall (2))
lim
Mi→0
M−1i P¯i( ~M, ~ψ) ≡ lim
Mi→0
µ−1(Aλ(
~Mi)
i )
∫
A
λ( ~Mi)
i
ψidµ ∈ Conv{ψi(xi)} ,
where Conv{·} stands for the convex hull, and the limit is uniquely determined if {xi} is a singleton.
C.f Fig 1.
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Figure 1: The optimal share A1 of capacity M1 is determined by the level line of ψ1 − ψ2 ≥ λ,
containing the maximal point x1 of this function.
Example 2.2. Suppose ψ is a non-negative, continuous function on X verifying µ(x;ψ(x) = r) = 0
for any r ≥ 0. Let λN > λN−1 > . . . λ1 > 0 be constants. We assume ψi := λiψ verifies assumption
2.1.
From (3, 4) we obtain
A+0 (~p) ≡ {x;ψ(x) < min
i∈I
λ−1i pi} ; A+i (~p) ≡
{
x; min
j>i
pj − pi
λj − λi > ψ(x) > maxj<i
pj − pi
λj − λi
}
−A+0 (~p) .
In particular, the partition A+i (~p) are consists of unions of level sets of the function ψ.
At optimal partition we observe that the share of the ”top agent” N is just the level set
AN := A
λ¯N ≡ {x ∈ X; ψ(x) ≥ λ¯N}
where
λ¯N := sup{λ;µ(Aλ) > MN} = inf{λ;µ(Aλ) < MN}
(compare with (11, 12)). By induction we can proceed to find
Aj := A
λ¯j+1,λ¯j ≡ {x ∈ X; λ¯j+1 ≥ ψ(x) ≥ λ¯j} , (13)
where λ¯j+1 is known by the induction step and
λ¯j := inf{λ ≥ 0;µ(Aλ¯j+1,λ) < Mj} .
An equivalent representation of the optimal partition is obtained as follows: Let As := {x ∈
X;ψ(x) ≤ s}, f(s) := µ(As), F (t) :=
∫ t
0 f(s)ds, F
∗(m) := supt∈R[mt − F (t)]. Note that F is
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a convex function and F ∗ is its Legendre transform, which is convex as well and is defined on the
interval [0, µ(X)]. Moreover, by duality
F ∗(µ(As)) ≡
∫
As
ψdµ.
Given ~M ∈ RN+ , let MN+1 := µ(X), Mj := [Mj+1 −Mj ]+ for j = N,N − 1, . . . 1. Then
λ¯i = F
∗(Mi), so (13) is written as
Ai := {x ∈ X;F ∗(Mi) < ψ(x) ≤ F ∗(Mi+1)} ; N ≥ i ≥ 1 .
Note that the optimal partition does not depend on ~λ := (λ1, . . . , λN ), as there is no relation between
λi and λ¯i. However, the total profit Σ~ψ(
~M) does, of course, depend on ~λ:
Σ~ψ(
~M) =
N∑
i=1
λi
∫
Ai
ψdµ ≡
N∑
i=1
λi(F
∗(Mi+1)− F ∗ (Mi)) . (14)
C.f Fig. 2.
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Figure 2: Representation of s 7→ F ∗(s)) corresponding to ψ, and optimal partition for ψi = λiψ,i =
1, 2, 3 subjected to capacities ~M = (M1,M2,M3) at saturation. Here λ3 < 1.
3 Individual values
At the equilibrium price ~p0, the profit of agent i is just p0,iµ(A
+
i (~p0)). The profit gained by the set
of her consumers A+i (~p0) is ∫
A+i (~p0)
(ψi(x)− pi,0) dµ .
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The sum of the profits is
P¯i :=
∫
A+i (~p0)
ψidµ , (15)
which, by Theorem 1, equals the consumer’s part at the optimal partition A¯i( ~M, ~ψ) in the ”Big
Brother” paradigm given by (2). We denote P¯i( ~M, ~ψ) as the individual value (i.v) of agent i,
occasionally omitting its dependence on ~M, ~ψ.
Assumption 3.1. Let (~ψ, ~M) verify Assumption 2.1. Let ~˜ψ given by ψ˜i = ψi for i 6= 1. In other
words, the wisdom ψ1 of agent 1 is replaced by ψ˜1 while keeping ψi, 2 ≤ i ≤ N and ~M unchanged.
The new system ( ~˜ψ, ~M) verifies Assumption 2.1 as well. We denote P˜1 the i.v of agent 1 after this
change takes place.
Do wiser agents always get higher values? Assuming a system of two agents in saturation
and suppose that, after some education and training, agent 1 improves her wisdom, so, in the
notation of Assumption 3.1, ψ˜1 ≥ ψ1 on X. We expect that the i.v of the first agent P¯1 will
increase under this change, so P˜1 ≥ P¯1. Is it so, indeed?
Well, not necessarily! Suppose M1 << µ(X) and let x1 be a unique maximizer of ψ1 − ψ2.
According to Example 2.1, P¯1 ≈ M1ψ1(x1). Let x˜1 be a unique maximizer of ψ˜1 − ψ2. Now,
P˜1 ≈M1ψ˜1(x˜1). But it may happen that ψ˜1(x˜1) < ψ1(x1), even though ψ˜1 > ψ1 everywhere!
Definitely, there are cases for which an increase in the wisdom of a given agent will increase her
i.v, independently of her own capacity, as well as the wisdoms and capacity of the other agents. In
particular, we can think about two cases where the above argument fails:
Case 1: If ψ˜1 = ψ1 + λ, where λ > 0 is a constant.
Case 2: if ψ˜1 = βψ1, where β ≥ 2 is a constant.
In the first case the ”gaps” ψ1−ψ2 and ψ˜1−ψ2 preserve their order, so if x1 is a maximizer of the
first, it is also a maximizer of the second. In particular the optimal partition A¯1, A¯2 is unchanged,
and we can even predict that P˜1 = P¯1 + λM1 > P¯1 (c.f Theorem 2 below).
In the second case the order of gaps may change. It is certainly possible that ψ˜1(x˜1)−ψ2(x˜1) >
ψ˜1(x1) − ψ2(x1) (where x1, x˜1 as above), but, if this is the case, an elementary calculation yields
ψ˜1(x˜1) > ψ1(x1), so the above argument fails. Indeed, if we assume both βψ1(x˜1) − ψ2(x˜1) >
βψ1(x1)−ψ2(x1) and βψ1(x˜1) < ψ1(x1), then ψ1(x1)−ψ2(x1) < −ψ2(x˜1) < ψ1(x˜1)−ψ2(x˜1) (since
ψ1 ≥ 0 and β ≥ 2), so x1 cannot be the maximizer of ψ1 − ψ2 as assumed.
In fact, more can be said:
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 3.1,
i) If ψ˜1 = βψ1 for a constant β > 0 then P˜1 ≥ βP¯1 if β > 1, P˜1 ≤ βP¯1 if β < 1.
ii) In the saturation and under saturation cases, if ψ˜1 = ψ1 + λ for a constant λ > 0 then
P˜1 = P¯1 + λM1.
In Theorem 3 we expand on case (i) of Theorem 2 and obtain the following, somewhat surprising
result:
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Theorem 3. Under Definition 3.1,
i) Suppose ψ˜1 ≥ βψ1 where β > 1 is a constant. Then
P˜1 ≥ (β − 1)P¯1 . (16)
ii) For any β > 2, s > β−1 there exists such a system (~ψ, ~M) and ψ˜1 ≥ βψ1 verifying Assumption
3.1 such that
P˜1 < sP¯1 .
In particular, the inequality (16) is sharp in the case β > 2.
Corollary 3.1. The i.v of an agent cannot decrease if its wisdom ψi is at least doubled (ψ˜i ≥ 2ψi).
In Theorem 4 we obtain sharp conditions for decrease of i.v, given an increase of the corre-
sponding wisdom:
Theorem 4. Under Assumption 3.1, in the under saturation/saturation cases:
i)If 1 < β < 2, λ ≥ 0 and
βψ1(x) ≤ ψ˜1(x) ≤ βψ1(x) + λ , (17)
then
P˜1 ≥ P¯1 − M1λ(2− β)
β − 1 . (18)
ii) For any 1 < β < 2, λ > 0, s < λ(2− β)/(β − 1) there exists a system (~ψ, ~M) and
βψ1 ≤ ψ˜1 ≤ βψ1 + λ verifying Assumption 3.1 such that
P˜1 < P¯1 −M1s .
In particular, the inequality (18) is sharp.
The proofs of Theorems 2-4 are given in Section 5.
4 Coalition/Partition games
4.1 Cartels and coalitions
Suppose that some agents J ⊂ I decide to establish a cartel. In the free market interpretation it
means that they coordinate the price of their services, i.e. pi := pJ for some pJ ∈ R for any i ∈ J .
In the big brother interpretation it means that J is replaced by a single ”agent” whose capacity is
MJ :=
∑
i∈J
Mi (19)
and its wisdom is the maximal wisdom of its agents, namely
ψJ(x) := max
i∈J
ψi(x) ∀x ∈ X . (20)
9
More generally, let J := {J1, . . . Jk} where Ji ∈ 2I a disjoint covering of I, that is
I = ∪ki=1Ji , Ji ∩ Jl = ∅ ∀i 6= l ∈ {1, . . . k}
Let MJ := {MJ1 , . . .MJk}, ψJ := {ψJ1 , . . . ψJk}. Let ~1(i) ∈ RN given by 1(i)j = 1 if j ∈ Ji, 1(i)j = 0
if j 6∈ Ji. Let RJ := Span
{
~1(1), . . .~1(k)
}
⊂ RN . In analogy to (1) we set
ΣψJ (
~MJ ) := max
~A∈P ~MJ
∑
J∈J
PψJ (AJ) . (21)
Ξ0~ψJ
(~p) :=
∫
X
max
J∈J
[ψJ(x)− pJ ]+dµ(x) : Rk → R . (22)
Proposition 4.1. Assume the conditions of Theorem 1. Given a partition J of I as above, we get
in the US,S cases
Σ~ψJ (
~MJ ) = min
~p∈RJ
Ξ0~ψJ
(~p) + ~p · ~MJ .
where Ξ0~ψJ
as defined in (22). In the OS case,
Σ~ψJ (
~MJ ) = max
~m≤ ~M
min
~p∈RJ
Ξ0~ψJ
(~p) + ~p · ~MJ .
In all cases there exists a unique equilibrium price vector ~p0 ∈ RJ , and the corresponding partition
is the unique partition verifying (21).
Proof. First note that
{x ∈ X;ψJ(x)− ψJ ′ (x) = r} ⊂ ∪j∈J,i∈J ′{x ∈ X;ψj(x)− ψi(x) = r}
for any J, J
′ ∈ ~J so (6, 7) imply, for any r ∈ R,
µ(x;ψJ(x)− ψJ ′ (x) = r) = 0 ; µ(x;ψJ(x) = r) = 0 ∀ J, J
′ ∈ J .
Hence, the conditions of Theorem 1 hold for this modified setting. The only thing left to show is
that for each ~p ∈ RJ , the associated partition ~A+(~p) (c.f. 3, 4) is in PMJ . This follows immediately
from the following trivial identity: if ~p := pJ1~1
(1) + . . .+ pJk~1
(k) ∈ RJ then
max
j∈I
[ψj(x)− pj ]+ ≡ max
J∈J
[ψJ(x)− pJ ]+ .
Thus, the Proposition follows from Theorem 1 applied to this modified system.
Note that Proposition 4.1 does not say anything about the partition inside a coalition J . In
fact, it determines only the set of consumers A¯+J of this coalition. In particular, the joint value of
the coalition J is
P¯J( ~M, ~ψ) :=
∫
A¯+J
ψJdµ .
Do the agents of this coalition benefit from their collaboration? A necessary condition for this is
that the combined value of the coalition J is, at least, not smaller than the sum of the values of its
members standing alone, namely ∑
i∈J
P¯{i}( ~M, ~ψ) ≤ P¯J( ~M, ~ψ) ? (23)
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where P¯{i}( ~M, ~ψ) is the i.v of i ∈ J determined by the assumption that the coalition J is disin-
tegrated and its members are competing as individuals. In order to test the inequality, suppose
N = 3 and J1 = {1, 2}, J2 = {3}. Suppose further that M2 is very small, so P¯2( ~M, ~ψ) ≈ 0 while
the i.v of agent 1, standing alone, is the same as her i.v if she competes with agent 3 only, and her
wisdom is ψ1.
On the other hand, the i.v. of the coalition J is approximated by the i.v of agent 1 playing
against agent 3, where now her wisdom is, by Proposition 4.1, ψ1,2 := max(ψ1, ψ2). Hence (23) is
reduced into
P¯{1}(M1,M3, ψ1, ψ3) ≤ P¯{1}(M1,M3, ψ1,2, ψ3) ? (24)
Since ψ1,2 ≥ ψ1 it raises the question of monotonicity of i.v with respect to their wisdom. We may
question this intuition, based on Theorem 4 in Section 3.
4.2 Review on cooperative games
A cooperative game is a game where groups of players (”coalitions”) may enforce cooperative
behavior, hence the game is a competition between coalitions of players, rather than between
individual players.
This section is based on the monograph [12].
Definition 4.1. A cooperative game (CG game) in I := {1, . . . N} is given by a reward function ν
on the subsets of I:
ν : 2I → R , ν(∅) = 0 .
Definition 4.2. The core of a game ν : 2I → R+, Core(ν), is a set of vectors ~x := (x1, . . . xN ) ∈
RN which satisfy the following conditions ∑
i∈I
xi ≤ ν(I) (25)
and
∀J ⊆ I,
∑
i∈J
xj ≥ ν(J) . (26)
The grand coalition J = I is stable if the core is not empty.
Non-emptiness of the core guarantees that no sub-coalition J of the grand coalition I will be
formed. Indeed, if such a sub-coalition J is formed, its reward ν(J) is not larger than the sum of
the rewards of its members, guaranteed by the grand coalition.
In many cases, however, the core is empty.
We can easily find a necessary condition for the core to be non-empty. Suppose we divide I
into a set of coalitions Jk ⊂ I , k = 1, . . .m such that Jk ∩ Jk′ = ∅ for k 6= k
′
and ∪mk=1Jj = I.
Proposition 4.2. For any such division, the condition
m∑
k=1
ν(Jk) ≤ ν(I) (27)
is necessary for the grand coalition to be stable.
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Proof. Suppose ~x ∈ Core(ν). Let ν˜(J) := ∑i∈J xi. Then ν˜(J) ≥ ν(J) for any J ⊆ I. If (27) is
violated for some division {J1, . . . Jm}, then
∑m
k=1 ν˜(Jk) ≥
∑m
k=1 ν(Jk) > ν(I). On the other hand,∑m
k=1 ν˜(Jk) =
∑
i∈I xi ≤ ν(I), so we get a contradiction.
Note that super-additivity
ν(J1) + ν(J2) ≤ ν(J1 ∪ J2) ∀ J1 ∩ J2 = ∅ (28)
is a sufficient condition for (27). However, (28) by itself is not a sufficient condition for the stability
of the grand coalition.
Example 4.1. In case N = 3 the game ν(1) = ν(2) = ν(3) = 0, ν(12) = ν(23) = ν(13) = 3/4,
ν(123) = 1 is super-additive but its core is empty.
We may extend condition (27) as follows: A weak division is a function λ : 2I → R which
satisfies the following:
i) For any J ⊆ I, λ(J) ≥ 0.
ii) For any i ∈ I, ∑J⊆I;i∈J λ(J) = 1.
A collection of such sets {J ⊂ I;λ(J) > 0} verifying (i,ii) is called a balanced collection [12].
We can think about λ(J) as the probability of the coalition J . Note that any division {J1, . . . Jm}
is, in particular, a weak division where λ(J) = 1 if J ∈ {J1, . . . Jm}, and λ(J) = 0 otherwise.
It is not difficult to extend the necessary condition (27) to weak subdivisions as follows:
Proposition 4.3. For any weak subdivision λ, the condition∑
J∈2I
λ(J)ν(J) ≤ ν(I) (29)
is necessary for the grand coalition to be stable.
The proof of Proposition 4.3 is a slight modification of the proof of Proposition 4.2.
However, (29) is also a sufficient condition for the stability of the grand coalition I. This is the
content of Bondareva-Shapley Theorem [11], [26], [27]:
Theorem 5. The grand coalition is stable if and only if it satisfies (29) for any weak division λ.
The condition of Theorem 5 is easily verified for super-additive game in case N = 3.
Corollary 4.1. A super additive cooperative game of 3 agents (N = 3) admits a non-empty core
iff
ν(12) + ν(13) + ν(23) < 2ν(123) . (30)
Indeed, it can easily be shown that all weak subdivision for N = 3 are spanned by
λ(J) = 1/2 if J = (12), (13), (23) ; λ(J) = 0 otherwise ,
and the trivial ones.
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4.3 Back to coalition/partition game
We define a cooperative game for the N agents which is based on the following:
• Let ~ψ be a wisdom vector verifying Assumption 2.1, and ~M a capacity vector in saturation
(i.e
∑
i∈IMi = µ(X)).
• Let J ⊆ I be a coalition, and J− := I − J is the complementary coalition.
• Consider the two superagents J, J− subjected to the capacities MJ ,MJ− and wisdoms ψJ , ψJ−
as defined in (19, 20).
• By Theorem 1 and Proposition 4.1 there exists a unique maximizer A¯J , A¯J− of
(AJ , AJ−) ∈ PMJ ,MJ− 7→
∫
AJ
ψJdµ+
∫
AJ−
ψJ−dµ .
• Let P¯J :=
∫
A¯J
ψJdµ be the i.v of the coalition J under optimal partition.
Definition 4.3. A coalition/partition (CP) game is given by a function on the subsets of I:
ν : 2I → R+ ; ν(J) := P¯J .
In particular, ν(I) =
∫
X ψIdµ, and ν(∅) = 0.
Note that the CP game satisfies the following condition: For each J ⊂ I,
ν(J) + ν(J−) ≤ ν(I) ∀ J ⊂ I , (31)
which is a necessary condition for super-additivity (28).
However, a CP game is not super-additive in general. In fact, the inequality (24) may be
violated, as we know from Theorem 4.
There is a special case, introduced in Example 2.2, Section 2, for which we can guarantee
super-additivity for PC game:
Assumption 4.1. There exists non-negative ψ : X ∈ C(X) satisfying µ(x;ψ(x) = r) = 0 for
any r ∈ R. The wisdoms ψi are given by ψi = λiψ where ~λ := (λ1, . . . λN ) ∈ RN+ such that
0 < λ1 < . . . < λN . We further assume the saturation case
∑N
i=1Mi = µ(X).
Proposition 4.4. Under assumption 4.1, for any ~M ∈ RN+ , the corresponding CP game is super-
additive.
Proof. From Example 2.2 (in particular from (14)) we obtain that the i.v. of agent i under optimal
partition is
P¯i ≡ λi (F ∗(Mi+1)− F ∗(Mi)) . (32)
Note that F ∗ is convex on [0, 1] by Example 2.2. In addition, F ∗(0) = 0.
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It follows that for any α, β > 0 such that α+ β ≤ 1:
F ∗(α+ β) ≥ F ∗(α) + F ∗(β) . (33)
Indeed, since F ∗ is convex
F ∗(α+ β) ≥ F ∗(α) + β(F ∗)′(α) . (34)
By the same argument
0 = F ∗(0) ≥ F ∗(β)− β(F ∗)′(β) . (35)
Assuming, with no loss of generality, that α ≥ β, we get (33) from the convexity of F ∗ which
implies (F ∗)′(α) ≥ (F ∗)′(β), together with (34, 35).
By the definition of the CP game and (32) we obtain that
ν(J) = λN (F
∗(µ(X))− F ∗(µ(X)−MJ)) if {N} ∈ J ;
ν(J) = λJ(F
∗(MJ)− F ∗(0)) ≡ λJF ∗(MJ) if {N} 6∈ J . (36)
where λJ := maxi∈J λi.
Let now J1, J2 ⊂ I such that J1 ∩ J2 = ∅ (in particular, MJ1 + MJ2 ≤ µ(X) since ~M is a
saturated vector).
Assume first {N} 6∈ J1 ∪ J2. Then from (36, 33)
ν(J1 ∪ J2) = max(λJ1 , λJ2)F ∗(MJ1∪J2) = max(λJ1 , λJ2)F ∗(MJ1 +MJ2)
≥ λJ1F ∗(MJ1) + λJ2F ∗(MJ2) = ν(J1) + ν(J2) . (37)
Next, if, say, {N} ∈ J1 then
ν(J1∪J2) = λN (F ∗(µ(X))−F ∗(µ(X)−MJ1 +MJ2)) , ν(J1) = λN (F ∗(µ(X))−F ∗(µ(X)−MJ1)) ,
ν(J2) = λJ2F
∗(MJ2) ,
so
ν(J1 ∪ J2)− ν(J1)− ν(J2) ≥ λN [F ∗(1−MJ1)− F ∗(MJ2)− F ∗(1− (MJ1 +MJ2)] ≥ 0 ,
again, by (33).
Under the assumption of Proposition 4.4 we may guess, intuitively, that the grand coalition is
stable if the gap between the wisdoms of the agents is sufficiently large (so the other agents are
motivated to join the smartest one), and the capacity of the wisest agent (N) is sufficiently small
(so (s)he is motivated to join the others as well). Below we prove this intuition in the case N = 3:
Proposition 4.5. Under the assumption of Proposition 4.4 and N = 3,
λ3
λ2
>
F ∗(M1 +M2)
F ∗(M2) + F ∗(M1)
is a necessary and sufficient for the stability of the grand coalition (i.e the non-emptiness of a core).
Here F ∗ is as defined in Example 2.2 (Section 2).
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Proof. From Corollary 4.1 and Proposition 4.4 we have only to prove (30). Now,
ν(123) = λ3F
∗(µ(X)) , ν(13) = λ3(F ∗(µ(X))− F ∗(M2)), ν(23) = λ3(F ∗(µ(X))− F ∗(M1))
and
ν(12) = λ2F
∗(M1 +M2) .
The result follows from substituting the above in (30).
5 Free Market vs. Big Brother: Duality
Here we verify the dual nature of the free-market/big brother formulation and prove Theorem 1.
This duality is also the main tool for proving Theorems 3, 4. The key Lemmas for all these results
are the following:
Lemma 5.1. Let
Ξ~ψ(~p) :=
∫
X
max
i∈I
[ψi(x)− pi]dµ(x) . (38)
where ~ψ := {ψ1, . . . ψN} satisfies (6). Then Ξ~ψ is convex on RN . Moreover, it is differentiable at
any point and
∂Ξ~ψ
∂pi
(~p) = −µ(Ai(~p)) . (39)
Here
Ai(~p) := {x ∈ X; ψi(x)− pi < ψj(x)− pj ∀j 6= i} . (40)
Proof. Note that Ai(~p) are mutually disjoint and, by (6), µ(∪i∈IAi(~p)) = µ(X).
Consider ξ : X × RN → R give by ξ(x, ~p) = maxi∈I [ψi(x) − pi]. Then ξ is convex on RN for any
x ∈ X. Moreover,
∂ξ
∂pi
=
{ −1 if x ∈ Ai(~p)
0 if ∃j 6= i, x ∈ Aj(~p)
In particular, the ~p derivatives of ξ exists µ a.e in X, ∇~pξ ∈ L1(X) for any ~p ∈ RN and are uni-
formly integrable. Since Ξ~ψ :=
∫
X ξdµ by definition, it is still convex in R
N , its derivatives exists
everywhere and ∇~pΞ~ψ =
∫ ∇~pξ(x, ~p)dµ(x).
Lemma 5.2. Let a > 0 and ~ψ := ~ψ(x, t) : X × [0, a]→ RN+ for any t ∈ [0, a]. Assume further that
each component t 7→ ψi(x, t) is convex and differentiable for any x ∈ RN and
∂tψi := ψ˙i ∈ L∞(X × [0, a])
for any i ∈ I. Then the functions
(~p, t) 7→ Ξ(~p, t) :=
∫
X
max
i∈I
[ψi(x, t)− pi]dµ(x)
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is convex on RN × [0, a], and, if its t derivative Ξ˙ := ∂tΞ exists at (~p, t) then
Ξ˙(p, t) =
∑
i∈I
∫
Ai(~p,t)
ψ˙i(x, t)dµ (41)
Here
Ai(~p, t) := {x ∈ X; ψi(x, t)− pi > ψj(x, t)− pj ∀j 6= i} . (42)
Proof. The proof is basically the same as the proof of Lemma 5.1. Here we define ξ : X × RN ×
[0, a] → R give by ξ(x, ~p, t) = maxi∈I [ψi(x, t) − pi], and Ξ(~p, t) :=
∫
X ξ(x, ~p, t)dµ(x). Again, ξ is
convex on RN × [0, a] for any x ∈ X so Ξ is convex on RN × [0, a] as well, while
ξ˙ =
{
ψ˙i(x, t) if x ∈ Ai(~p, t)
0 if ∃j 6= i, x ∈ Aj(~p, t)
implies (41).
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Note the difference between Ξ~ψ (38) and Ξ
0
~ψ
(8). Observe that
Ξ~ψ(~p+ α
~1) = Ξ~ψ(~p)− αµ(X) ; ~1 := (1, . . . 1) ∈ RN . (43)
In particular ∇Ξ~ψ(~p) = ∇Ξ~ψ(~p+ γ~1) and, in the saturated case ~M ·~1 = µ(X):
Ξ~ψ(~p) +
~M · ~p = Ξ~ψ(~p+ γ~1) + ~M · (~p+ γ~1)
for any γ ∈ R.
Remark 5.1. In the saturation case it follows that ~p 7→ Ξ~ψ(~p) + ~p · ~M is invariant under the shift.
In addition we observe that, for −γ large enough, such that A+0 (~p+ γ~1) = ∅,
Ξ0~ψ(~p+ γ
~1) = Ξ~ψ(~p+ γ
~1)
(recall Remark 2.3). So, in the saturation case, we may replace Ξ0~ψ
by Ξ~ψ and restrict the domain
of Ξ~ψ to
~p ∈ RN , ~p ·~1 = 0 . (44)
Remark 5.2. We may actually unify the under-saturated and saturated cases (US+S). Indeed,
in the under-saturated case we add the ”null agent” whose wisdom ψ0 = 0 and whose capacity is
M0 := µ(X)−
∑
i∈IMi. In that case we restrict our domain (p0, p1, . . . pN ) ∈ RN+1 to p0 = 0, and
we get by definition (8, 38)
Ξ ~0,ψ(0, p1, . . . pN ) = Ξ
0
~ψ
(p1, . . . pN )
Hence the proof of the first part (saturated case), given below, includes also the proof of the under-
saturated case. The over-saturated case will be treated later on.
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Let ~A be any partition in
P ~M := { ~A; µ(Ai) = Mi and µ(Ai ∩Aj) = 0 if i 6= j ∈ I .}
Then
Σ~ψ(
~A) :=
∑
i∈I
∫
Ai
ψidµ =
∑
i∈I
∫
Ai
(ψi − pi)dµ+ ~M · ~p
≤
∑
i∈I
∫
Ai
max
i∈i
(ψi − pi)dµ+ ~M · ~p =
∫
X
max
i∈i
(ψi − pi)dµ+ ~M · ~p := Ξ~ψ(~p) + ~M · ~p . (45)
In particular
Σ¯~ψ(
~M) := sup
~A∈P ~M
Σ~ψ(
~A) ≤ inf
~p∈RN
Ξ~ψ(~p) +
~M · ~p . (46)
Suppose we prove the existence of a minimizer ~p0 to the right side of (46). Then, by Lemma 5.1
(39) we get
∂Ξ~ψ
∂pi
(~p0) = −Mi i ∈ I.
Moreover, ~A(~p0) ∈ P ~M is an optimal partition so there is an equality in (46). Conversely, if ~A ∈ P ~M
is an optimal partition then there is an equality in (45) so
ψi(x)− p0,i = max
j∈I
(ψj(x)− p0,j)
for µ a.e. x ∈ Ai. Hence Ai ⊆ Ai(~p0) (up to a negligible µ set). By (5) we know that µ(∪i∈IAi) =
µ(X) so Ai = Ai(~p0), again up to a negligible µ set. In particular it follows that an optimal
partition ~¯A ∈ P ~M for Σ~ψ is unique
We now prove the existence of such a minimizer ~p0. Let ~pn be a minimizing sequence of
~p 7→ Ξ~ψ(~p)− ~p · ~M , that is
lim
n→∞Ξ~ψ(~pn) + ~pn · ~M = inf~p∈RN Ξ~ψ(~pn) + ~pn ·
~M .
Let ‖~p‖2 := (
∑
i∈I p
2
i )
1/2 be the Euclidian norm of ~p. If we prove that for any minimizing
sequence ~pn the norms ‖~pn‖2 are uniformly bounded, then there exists a converging subsequence
whose limit is the minimizer ~p0, and we are done. This follows, in particular, since Ξ~ψ is a closed
(lower-semi-continuous) function.
Assume there exists a subsequence along which ‖~pn‖2 →∞. Let ~ˆpn := ~pn/‖~pn‖2. Then
Ξ~ψ(~pn) + ~pn · ~M :=
[
Ξ~ψ(~pn)− ~pn · ∇~pΞ~ψ(~pn)
]
+ ~pn ·
(
∇~pΞ~ψ(~pn) + ~M
)
=
[
Ξ~ψ(~pn)− ~pn · ∇~pΞ~ψ(~pn)
]
+ ‖~pn‖2~ˆpn ·
(
∇~pΞ~ψ(~pn) + ~M
)
. (47)
Note that
Ξ~ψ(~p)− ~p · ∇Ξ~ψ(~p) =
∑
i∈I
∫
Ai(~p)
ψidµ , (48)
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so, in particular
0 ≤
∫
X
min
i∈I
ψidµ ≤
[
Ξ~ψ(~p)− ~p · ∇~pΞ~ψ(~p)
]
=
∑
i∈I
∫
Ai(~p)
ψi(x)dµ ≤
∫
X
max
i∈I
ψidµ <∞ . (49)
By (47- 49) we obtain, for ‖~pn‖2 →∞,
lim
n→∞ ~ˆpn ·
(
∇~pΞ~ψ(~pn) + ~M
)
= 0 . (50)
Since ~ˆpn lives in the unit sphere S
N−1 (which is a compact set), there exists a subsequence for
which ~ˆpn → ~ˆp0 := (pˆ0,1, . . . pˆ0,N ) ∈ SN−1. Let P− := mini∈I pˆi,0 and J− := {i ∈ I ; pˆ0,i = P−}.
Note that for n → ∞ along such a subsequence, pn,i − pn,i′ → ∞ for i 6∈ J−, i′ ∈ J−. It
follows that Ai(~pn) = ∅ if i 6∈ J− for n large enough, hence µ(∪i∈J−Ai(~pn)) = µ(X) = µ(X) for
n large enough. Let µni be the restriction of µ to Ai(~pn). Then the limit µ
n
i ⇀ µi exists (along a
subsequence) where n→∞. In particular, by Lemma 5.1
lim
n→∞
∂Ξ~ψ
∂pn,i
(~pn) = − lim
n→∞
∫
X
dµni = −
∫
X
dµi
while µi 6= 0 only if i ∈ J−, and
∑
i∈J− µi = µ. Since ~ˆp0,i = P− for i ∈ J− is the minimal value of
the coordinates of ~ˆp0, it follows that
lim
n→∞ ~ˆpn ·
(
∇~pΞ~ψ(~pn) + ~M
)
= − ~M · ~ˆp0 + P−
∑
i∈J−
∫
X
dµi = − ~M · ~ˆp0 + P− .
Now, by definition, ~M · ~ˆp0 > P− unless J− = I. In the last case we obtain a contradiction of (44)
since it implies ~ˆp0 = 0 which contradicts ~ˆp0 ∈ SN−1. So, if J− is a proper subset of I we obtain
a contradiction to (50). Hence ‖~pn‖2 is bounded, and a minimizer ~p0 exists. This concludes the
proof of the Theorem for the saturation and under saturation case (c.f. Remark 5.2).
To complete the proof for the over-saturation case we will show that the minimizer of (10) is
unique. This follows from the strict concavity of the function ~m 7→ Σ~ψ(~m) on the simplex
SN := {~m ∈ RN+ ; ~m ·~1 ≤ µ(X)} . (51)
The proof of this strict concavity is given at the Appendix (Section 7). 2
5.2 Individual values: Proof of Theorems 2, 3, 4
For these we will use Lemma 5.2 in addition to Lemma 5.1.
The proof of Theorem 2 is the easiest:
Proof. of Theorem 2
i) Let ~t := (t1, . . . tN ) ∈ RN . Let ~t⊗ ~ψ(x) := (t1ψ1(x), . . . tNψN (x)). Consider
Ξ(~t, ~p) := Ξ~t⊗~ψ(~p) . (52)
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By Lemma 5.2, (~t, ~p) 7→ Ξ is convex on RN × RN (in particular, convex in ~p for fixed ~t and
convex in ~t for fixed ~p). In addition
∂tiΞ(~t, ~p) =
∫
Ai(~p,~t)
ψidµ ≡ t−1i Pi(~t) (53)
where
Ai(~p,~t) := {x ∈ X; tiψi(x)− pi < tjψj(x)− pj ∀j 6= 1} , (54)
whenever ∂tiΞ exists. Let
Σ(~t, ~M) := min
~p∈RN
Ξ(~p,~t) + ~M · ~p . (55)
Recall that Σ(~t, ~M) = −∞ unless ~M is saturated. Still, it is real valued, convex as a function
of ~t for any saturated ~M . If ~M is over-saturated then
Σ(~t, ~M) := max
~m≤ ~M
min
~p∈RN
Ξ(~p,~t) + ~m · ~p
is convex in ~t as well.
Then
∂tiΣ =
∫
Ai(~p0,~t)
ψidµ ≡ t−1i P (~t)
holds, where ~p0 := ~p0( ~M,~t) is the unique equilibrium price vector (perhaps up to an additive
constant) guaranteed by Theorem 1 for the utility vector ~t ⊗ ~ψ. Since the derivative of a
convex function on the line is monotone non-decreasing we get for ~t(β) := (β, 1; . . . 1), β > 1
P1(~t(β))/β ≡ ∂βΣ(~t(β), ~M) ≥ ∂sΣ(~t(s=1), ~M) ≡ P¯1
where P˜1 ≡ P1(~t(β)) by (53, 54). This completes the proof for saturated and over-saturated
~M . The case of under-saturated ~M is included in the saturated case (c.f Remark 5.2).
ii) If ψ1 → ψ1 + λ then the optimal partition in the saturated and under saturated cases is
unchanged. Then
P˜1 :=
∫
A¯1
(ψ1 + λ)dµ =
∫
A¯1
ψ1dµ+ λ
∫
A¯1
dµ = P¯1 + λM1 .
Proof. of Theorem 3
i) Let σ := ψ˜1 − βψ1 ≥ 0, α := β − 1 ≥ 0 and a function φ : [0, 1] 7→ R satisfying
φ(0) = φ˙(0) = 0 and φ¨ ≥ 0 for any t ∈ [0, 1] , φ(1) = 1 . (56)
Define
ψ(x, t) := (1 + αt)ψ1(x) + σ(x)φ(t) . (57)
So
ψ(x, 1) = ψ˜1(x) (58)
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and ψ is convex in t ∈ [0, 1] for any x. Also ψ˙(x, t) = αψ1(x) + σ(x)φ˙(t). Let now δ > 0.
Then
ψ(x, 1) ≥ ψ˙(x, 1)− δ‖σ‖∞ (59)
provided
σ(x)φ˙(1) ≤ σ(x) + ψ1(x) + δ‖σ‖∞ . (60)
Since ψ1 and σ are non-negative, the later is guaranteed if φ˙(1) ≤ 1 + δ. So, we choose
φ(t) := t1+ for some  ∈ (0, δ]. This meets (56,60).
Let now Σ( ~M, t) := Σψ(,t),ψ2,...ψN (
~M). By Theorem 1,
Σ( ~M, t) := inf
~p∈RN
Ξ~ψ(·,t)(~p) + ~p · ~M
in the US, S cases and by Lemma 5.2, (~p, t) 7→ Ξ~ψ(·,t)(~p) is convex. So Σ is convex in t. In
the OS case
Σ( ~M, t) := sup
~m≤ ~M
inf
~p∈RN
Ξ~ψ(·,t)(~p) + ~p · ~m
is convex (as maximum of convex functions) as well. By the same Lemma
Σ˙( ~M, 0) =
∫
A¯1(0)
ψ˙(, 0)dµ = α
∫
A¯1(0)
ψ1dµ ≡ αP¯1 (61)
where A¯1(0) is the first component in the optimal partition associated with ~ψ, while, at t = 1
we obtain from convexity and (59)
Σ˙( ~M, 1) =
∫
A¯1(1)
ψ˙(x, 1)dµ ≤
∫
A¯1(1)
(ψ(x, 1) + δ‖σ‖∞)dµ ≤
∫
A¯1(1)
ψ(x, 1)dµ+ δ‖σ‖∞ (62)
where A¯1(1) is the first component in the optimal partition associated with
~ψ(1) := (ψ(, 1), ψ2, . . . ψN ). Since τ 7→ φ(τ) is convex, τ 7→ Σ( ~M, τ) is convex as well by
Lemma 5.2 and we get
Σ˙( ~M, 1) ≥ Σ˙( ~M, 0) . (63)
From (62, 63) ∫
A¯1(1)
ψ(x, 1)dµ ≥ αP¯1 − δ‖σ‖∞ .
Now, recall β := 1 + α and ψ(x, 1) := ψ˜1 by (58), so
∫
A¯1(1)
ψ(x, 1)dµ ≡ P˜1. Since δ > 0 is
arbitrary small, we obtain the result.
ii) Assume N = 2, M1 +M2 = µ(X). We show the existence of non-negative, continuous ψ1, ψ2,
x1, x2 ∈ X and λ > 0 such that, for given δ > 0
a) ∆(x) := ψ1(x)− ψ2(x) < ∆(x1) for any x ∈ X − {x1}.
b) ∆β(x) := βψ1(x)− ψ2(x) < ∆β(x1) for any x ∈ X − {x1}.
c) ∆β(x2) + λ = ∆β(x1) + δ.
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We show that (a-c) is consistent with
sψ1(x1) > βψ1(x2) + λ (64)
for given s > β − 1.
Suppose (64) is verified. Let
θ0 :=
{
1− |x−x2| if |x− x2| ≤ 
0 if |x− x2| >  (65)
(assuming, for simplicity, that X is a real interval). Set ψ˜1 := βψ1 +λθ0. If  is small enough
then ψ˜1 − ψ2 is maximized at x2 by (b,c), while ψ1 − ψ2 is maximized at x1 by (a). Letting
M1 << 1 we find, by Example 2.1, that P¯1 ≈M1ψ1(x1) and P˜1 ≈M1(βψ1(x2) + λθ0(x2)) =
M1(βψ1(x2) + λ). By (64) we obtain the result.
So, we have only to prove that (64) is consistent with (a-c). We rewrite it as
s
β − 1 [∆β(x1)−∆(x1)] >
β
β − 1 [∆β(x2)−∆(x2)] + λ .
From (c) we obtain
s
β − 1 [∆β(x1)−∆(x1)] >
β
β − 1 [∆β(x2)−∆(x2)] + ∆β(x1)−∆β(x2) + δ ,
that is
(s− β + 1)∆β(x1)−∆β(x2) > (s− β)∆(x2) + s(∆(x1)−∆(x2)) + δ(β − 1) . (66)
We now set ∆β(x1) and λ large enough, keeping δ,∆β(x2),∆(x1),∆(x2) fixed. Evidently, we
can do it such that (c) is preserved. Since s− β + 1 > 0 by assumption, we can get (66).
Proof. of Theorem 4.
i) Let β = 1 + t where t ∈ (0, 1). We change (57) into
ψ(x, t) := (1 + t)(ψ1(x) + γ) + σ(x)φ(t) (67)
and
ψ˜1 := (1 + t)ψ1 + σφ(t) (68)
where γ > 0 is a constant and σ ≥ 0 on X. Then ψ˙(x, t) = ψ1(x) + γ + σ(x)φ˙(t), and we
obtain
ψ(x, t) ≥ ψ˙(x, t), t > 0; ψ˙(x, 0) = ψ1(x) + γ (69)
provided
σ(x)φ˙(t) ≤ σ(x)φ(t) + t(ψ1(x) + γ) ; φ˙(0) = 0 . (70)
Since ψ1, σ are non-negative, the later is guaranteed if
φ˙(t) ≤ φ(t) + tγ‖σ‖∞ ; φ˙(0) = 0 . (71)
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Since t < 1, the choice φ(τ) := τ1+ for 0 ≤ τ ≤ t and  > 0 small enough (depending on t)
verifies (71) provided
‖σ‖∞ < γt/(1− t) . (72)
Hence we can let σ to be any function verifying (72). Then (67, 68) imply
(1 + t)ψ1(x) ≤ ψ˜1(x) ≤ (1 + t)ψ1(x) + γt
2+
1− t . (73)
Now, we note from the second part of (69) that
Σ˙( ~M, 0) =
∫
A¯1(0)
ψ˙(, 0)dµ =
∫
A¯1(0)
(ψ1 + γ)dµ ≡ P¯1 + γM1 (74)
since A1(0) is independent of γ in the S, US cases. In addition, (67, 68,71) imply
Σ˙( ~M, t) =
∫
A¯1(t)
ψ˙(, t)dµ ≤
∫
A¯1(t)
ψ(·, t)dµ =
∫
A¯1(t)
(ψ˜1 + (1 + t)γ)dµ ≡ P˜1 + (1 + t)γM1 ,
where A¯1(t) is the first component in the optimal partition associated with
~ψ(t) := (ψ(, t), ψ2, . . . ψN ). Since τ 7→ φ(τ) is convex, τ 7→ Σ( ~M, τ) is convex as well by
Lemma 5.2 and we get, as in (63)
Σ˙( ~M, t) ≥ Σ˙( ~M, 0) . (75)
where, again, we used that A¯1(t) is independent of γ and t > 0. Recalling β := 1 + t, let
λ := γ(β − 1)2/(2− β) and  small enough we get (17, 18), using (73,74, 75).
ii) Assume N = 2, M1 + M2 = 1, that ψ1 − ψ2 attains its maximum at x1, and x2 6= x1. Let
ψ˜1 := βψ1 + λθ0 where θ0 as defined in (65). We assume, as in part (ii) of the proof of
Theorem 3, that x1 is a maximizer of βψ1 − ψ2 as well.
Next, assume
βψ1(x1)− ψ2(x1) < λ+ βψ1(x2)− ψ2(x2) (76)
which implies, in particular, that x2 is the maximizer of ψ˜1 −ψ2 (see part (ii) of the proof of
Theorem 3). If, in addition,
ψ1(x1)− βψ1(x2)− λ− s > 0 , (77)
then, from Example 2.1,
P¯1 ≈ ψ1(x1)M1 > M1(ψ˜1(x2) + s) ≈ P˜1 + sM1 (78)
if M1 is small, and the proof is obtained.
From (76) and since x1 is a maximizer of ψ1 − ψ2:
λ > (β − 1)(ψ1(x1)− ψ1(x2))
so (77) and (76) are compatible provided
λ > (β − 1)2ψ1(x2) + (β − 1) [λ+ s] ,
namely
λ
2− β
β − 1 > (β − 1)ψ1(x2) + s . (79)
Thus, if we assume further that, say, ψ1(x2) = 0 (which is consistent with the assumption
that ψ1, ψ2 ≥ 0) then (79) is verified for s < λ(2− β)/(β − 1).
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6 Conclusions and further study
We proved the existence of a unique, optimal partitions of a given set of consumers served by a
finite set of agents of limited capacities, under certain conditions on their utilities (which were
interpreted as the agent’s ”wisdoms”). This result enabled us to define an individual value of an
agent and ask questions about the dependence of this individual value on her wisdom, where the
capacities of all agents and wisdoms of all other agents are fixed.
Our definition of individual value can be questioned. In fact, the profit of an agent is just
the price she charge per consumer, times the number of her consumers. Since, in our model, the
capacity of agent i is given by Mi in the saturation and under saturation case, one may suggest to
define her ”individual value” by
V ai := Mip
0
i
where p0i is the price of her service at equilibrium. Another possible definition is the combined
profit of her consumers, which is
V ci :=
∫
A¯i
(ψi(x)− p0i )dµ
where A¯i is the share of agent i under optimal partition. The individual value as defined in this
paper is just the sum
P¯i = V
a
i + V
c
i .
More general definition of individual values can be obtained by different combination of these two
values, such as
P¯α,βi := αV
a
i + βV
b
i ,
for given α, β ≥ 0.
However, the method used in this paper cannot be applied directly to the case α 6= β. The
reason is that all our results are strongly based on the convexity of Ξ := Ξ(~t, ~p) := Ξ~t⊗~ψ as a function
of all it variables (see (52)). In fact, Theorems 2-4 are all based on the identity P¯i := Pi(~1, ~M) for
the individual value, where
Pi(~t, ~M) =
∂Σ(~t, ~M)
∂ti
and Σ(~t, ~M) := min~p∈RN Ξ(~t, ~p) + ~p · ~M .
In order to extend our results to other definitions of individual value, say V ai , we my use the
duality p0i = ∂Σ/∂Mi at ~t = ~1. Thus V
a
i := V
a
i (~1,
~M) where
V ai (~t, ~M) := Mi∂MiΣ(~t,
~M)
and V bi := V
b
i (~1,
~M) where
V bi (~t,
~M) = Pi(~t, ~M)− V ai (~t, ~M) ≡ (∂ti −Mi∂Mi) Σ .
The dependence of V ai , V
b
i on the wisdom ψi for prescribed capacities
~M is related to the behaviour
of the functions ti 7→ V ai , V bi at fixed ~M .
The difficulty in analyzing the dependence of either V ai or V
c
i on ψi is originated from the fact
that we do not have any general estimate on the dependence of the partial Mi derivative of Σ as
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functions of ti. All we know about Σ is that it is convex in ~t and concave in ~M . On the other hand,
the dependence of the individual value P¯i, as defined in this paper, is known due to the convexity
of Σ in the variables ~t. Anyway, the analysis of the dependence of V ai , V
b
i on ψi is worth studying,
perhaps by numerical methods.
Acknowledgment: I would like to thank H. Brezis and R. Holtzmann for his helpful suggestion
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7 Appendix
We prove that the function ~m 7→ Σ~ψ(~m) as defined in (10) is strictly concave on the simplex (51).
To prove this we recall some basic elements form convexity theory (see, e.g. [16], [4]):
i) If F is a convex function on RN (say), then the sub gradient ∂F at point p ∈ RN is defined as
follows: ~q ∈ ∂F (~p) if and only if
F (~p′)− F (~p) ≥ ~q · (~p′ − ~p) ∀~p′ ∈ RN .
ii) The Legendre transform of F :
F ∗(~q) := sup
~p∈RN
~p · ~q − F (~p) ,
and Dom(F ∗) ⊂ RN is the set on which F ∗ <∞.
iii) The function F ∗ is convex (and closed), but Dom(F ∗) can be a proper subset of RN (or even
an empty set).
iv) The subgradient of a convex function is non-empty (and convex) at any point in the proper
domain of this function (i.e. at any point in which the function takes a value in R).
v) Young’s inequality
F (~p) + F ∗(~q) ≥ ~p · ~q
holds for any pair of points (~p, ~q) ∈ RN×RN . The equality holds iff ~q ∈ ∂F (~p), iff ~p ∈ ∂F ∗(~q).
vi) The Legendre transform is involuting, i.e F ∗∗ = F if F is convex and closed.
Returning to our case, let F (~p) := Ξ0~ψ
(~p). It is a convex function on RN by Lemma 5.1. Moreover,
its partial derivatives exists at any point in RN , which implies that its sub-gradient is s singleton.
Recalling (9) with Ξ~ψ we get that
F ∗(~m) ≡ −Σ~ψ(−~m)
takes finite values only on the simplex (51). So, we only have to prove the existence of a unique
minimizer (10) on the set SN ∩ {~m ≤ ~M}, which is a convex set as well. We prove below that F ∗
is strictly convex on the simples. This implies the strict concavity of Σ~ψ on the same simplex.
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Assume F ∗ is not strictly convex. It means there exists ~m1 6= ~m2 ∈ SN for which
F ∗(
~m1 + ~m2
2
) =
F ∗(~m1) + F ∗(~m2)
2
. (80)
Let ~m := ~m1/2 + ~m2/2, and ~p ∈ ∂F ∗(~m). Then, by (iv, v)
0 = F ∗(~m) + F ∗∗(~p)− ~p · ~m = F ∗(~m) + F (~p)− ~p · ~m . (81)
By (80, 81):
1
2
(F ∗(~m1) + F (~p)− ~p · ~m1) + 1
2
(F ∗(~m2) + F (~p)− ~p · ~m2) = 0
while (v) also guarantees
F ∗(~mi) + F (~p)− ~p · ~mi ≥ 0 , i = 1, 2 .
It follows
F ∗(~mi)− F (~p) + ~p · ~mi = 0 , i = 1, 2 ,
so, by (v) again, {~m1, ~m2} ∈ ∂F (~p), and we get a contradiction since ∂F (~p) is a singleton.
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